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AMONG WASHINGTON ACTIVISTS, the prospectsfor effective campaign finance reform
have often cycled between cautious optimism
and deep disillusionment. The general public
has been more steadfastly cynical, their demo-
cratic sensibilities deadened by the ever more
remarkable sums of money raised and spent by
private interests on public campaigns with
each new election.1 Surely, all that money must
be buying elections, bribing legislators, or bi-
asing legislation in some way—purchases that
“special interests” but not rank and file voters
can afford. Viewed in this light, the hallowed
democratic principle of “one person, one vote”
loses its normative luster.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA) represented a significant countermea-
sure to the widely criticized connection be-
tween private money and political influence.
Among its important provisions, the bill pro-
hibited the sometimes gargantuan soft money
contributions to political parties; it prohibited
corporate and labor union funding of “elec-
tioneering communications” and otherwise re-
quired disclosure of the authorship and fi-
nancing of such advertising; and it facilitated
the reliance of campaigns on hard money by
doubling the limits on individual contributions
to candidates.
These are significant reforms all, and they are
already exhibiting important effects on federal
campaign politics.2 Although a full-blown as-
sessment of those effects is not the purpose
here, two features of the post-BCRA environ-
ment suggest that additional and different re-
forms may be needed. First, the private money
still flowing into congressional campaigns in
large quantities continues to threaten the de-
mocratic integrity of post-election policymak-
ing. Second, campaign spending disparities 
between incumbents and challengers remain
extreme, and those disparities contribute to the
non-competitive nature of congressional elec-
tions. As a result, the values of voter choice and
democratic dialogue are diminished.
These two problems motivate what follows.
After briefly discussing their importance, I in-
troduce for discussion a new approach to fed-
eral campaign finance reform. The main idea is
to legally authorize and privately endow a non-
partisan “expenditure equalizing commission”
(EEC)—a nonprofit entity whose sole mission
would be to diminish inequalities in campaign
advertising expenditures across candidates for
the same congressional office. An EEC would
be able to raise funds from any source in un-
limited amounts, but the commission would
provide matching grants only to general elec-
tion candidates who are being significantly out-
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spent by their opponents. No conditions or re-
strictions would be placed on the recipients; 
indeed, grant monies would go to eligible can-
didates automatically according to a predeter-
mined formula. For practical reasons discussed
below, the EEC would begin by equalizing
spending in open seat races. Once an open seat
has been filled, subsequent races for the same
seat would be eligible for EEC subsidies
whether or not an incumbent is seeking reelec-
tion.
As such a campaign system fully matures,
several salutary changes should follow. First,
the prospect of automatic subsidies to other-
wise financially disadvantaged candidates
should induce higher quality challengers in
both parties to run for office. The result should
be increased competitiveness and more infor-
mative debates in congressional elections. Sec-
ond, the matching nature of the subsidy will
increase the incentive of disadvantaged candi-
dates to raise money through smaller contri-
butions and increase the incentives of small
and large contributors to give them more.
Third, the equalizing nature of the subsidies
will reduce the incentive of financially advan-
taged candidates to raise and spend ever larger
sums, and it will reduce the incentives for their
contributors to contribute. The arms-race na-
ture of campaign fundraising should thus di-
minish, as neither candidate could expect to
outspend the other. Fourth, parity in candi-
dates’ campaign spending should go up while
the importance of interest group contributions
should go down. This, in turn, should dimin-
ish the political indebtedness of winning can-
didates to moneyed interests in post-election
policymaking, what most observers take to be
the most important goal of campaign finance
reform. Finally, the EEC lacking any authority
to regulate the speech or expenditures of any
campaign actor, all of the above can occur with-
out infringing First Amendment guarantees of
free speech and association. A major concern
of past campaign reform debates will be
avoided and an important constitutional value
protected.
This article develops this proposal in pre-
liminary form, exploring ways the institution
and procedures might be designed and imple-
mented. In such an introduction, to be sure, nu-
merous problems will be given short shrift; im-
portant devils will remain in the logistical de-
tails. Although the proposal is fashioned with
an eye to political viability, that viability turns
first on the merits of the proposal, merits about
which reform advocates will invariably dis-
agree. In vetting it here, the hope is to explore
its possibilities, identify some of its limitations
and, more generally, to incite further discus-
sions about new ways to disengage big money
from congressional politics in the post-BCRA
era.
MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL 
POLITICS POST-BCRA
As with most reforms proposals, the BCRA
was not designed to solve all of the problems
of money in politics. Those who participated in
developing the main elements of BCRA ac-
knowledged that its main purpose was but “to
repair egregious tears in the regulatory fabric”
of campaign finance law, rent by the growth of
soft money and electioneering masquerading
as issue advertising (Mann and Ornstein 2002,
3). The act would thus “reinstate the status quo
ante of barely a decade ago” (Mann and Orn-
stein 2002, 3; Jacobson 2006, 201). Were the law
to do that much, its achievement would be sub-
stantial.3
That said, there is more that needs to be
done. Three points warrant emphasis. First, the
BCRA did not address problems of hard
money, problems long thought to be serious be-
fore the growing abuses of soft money in the
1990s. Political Action Committee (PAC) con-
tributions financed over 40% of House and 20%
of Senate campaign receipts in 2004, roughly
the percentages for the prior two elections.
More disturbingly, contributions from single
industries or economic sectors (e.g., agribusi-
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ness, oil and gas, health professionals) gener-
ated $100,000 or more for dozens of incumbents
well-placed to affect industry interests.4 Sec-
ond, advertising by advocacy organizations on
behalf of candidates doubled from 2000 to 2004
(Boatright et al. 2006), and constitutional prin-
ciples make this money difficult to regulate.
Third, as much as half of the soft money
banned by the BCRA has rematerialized as
spending by Section 527 organizations. In
short, whatever democratic illness private
money caused in years past, the BCRA of 2002
has not fully cured.
To be sure, the nature of that illness is often
mischaracterized. The problem is not so much
that too much money is being spent on cam-
paigns (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Sny-
der 2003), public perceptions to the contrary.
Nor is there strong evidence that we have The
Best Congress Money Can Buy (Stern 1998), sen-
sationalist allegations not withstanding. Social
scientific studies of PAC money’s influence on
roll call votes have proved mixed, for good the-
oretical and methodological reasons.5 Insofar
as we can tell, straight bribery is not the pri-
mary virus. But as the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged in McConnell v. FEC, it need not
be.6 The government has a legitimate interest
in preventing “more subtle but equally disqui-
eting forms of corruption . . . neither easily de-
tected nor practical to criminalize.”7 Especially
disquieting is the considerable evidence that
even if money does not influence elections or
roll call votes directly, it facilitates access 
and otherwise “buttresses lobbying activities”
(West and Loomis 1999, 228–229) meant to in-
fluence legislators’ priorities or their less visi-
ble legislative efforts off the floor (Evans 1996;
Hall and Wayman 1990).8 The overwhelming
tendency of PACs to give heavily to incum-
bents not in danger of defeat and to well-placed
allies whose favorable votes on legislation are
already assured is difficult to explain otherwise
(Grier and Munger 1993; Hall and Deardorff
2006). More direct evidence that money en-
hances access to influential legislators comes
from a variety of sources, including reports of
congressional insiders,9 limiting cases,10 com-
parative case research,11 and quantitative anal-
ysis.12 There is evidence enough to worry that
such money magnifies the voice of contributors
and thus fosters unequal representation,
thereby damaging the democratic integrity of





Starkly evident in the first congressional elec-
tions post-BCRA is the scarcity of meaningful
competition. By most measures, the 2004
House elections were the least competitive in
history. Ninety-five percent of the House races
were won by margins greater than 10%; 85%
were won by margins greater than 20%.13 The
odds of House incumbents retaining their seats
in the first election post-reform were about 60
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(p. 59). For wide-ranging investigative reporting that sup-
ports this point, see Birnbaum (1992).
10 One such case is Senator John Kerry’s 2004 partial re-
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byists, a ploy to upstage Bush on matters of White House
secrecy and cronyism. Presumably Kerry would not have
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(2004).
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12 See e.g., Langbein (1986); Langbein and Lotwis (1986);
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Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder (2002); Wright (1990).
13 For congressional election statistics used here, see the
Center for Responsive Politics website: http://www.
opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.asp?Cycle2004.
to 1, tied for the highest reelection rate in the
modern Congress. So too in the Senate: 96% of
the senators who sought reelection won in
2004, compared to 86% in 2002 and 79% in 2000.
Taken together, 94% of Senators and House
members who sought reelection in 2006 won—
this in a year of dramatic party reversal.
Of course, many factors unrelated to cam-
paign finance contribute to incumbents’ elec-
toral advantage, not least of which are con-
stituency service, pork barrel politics, and
political redistricting. But fundraising dispari-
ties matter, and campaign spending is dramat-
ically unequal between congressional incum-
bents and challengers. In 2004, the fundraising
advantage of House incumbents over chal-
lengers increased by $230,000—from a ratio of
4 1/2 to 1 to almost 6 to 1; in Senate races, the
gap grew by almost $3 million, from a ratio of
less than 6 to 1 to almost 9 to 1.14 The problem
these disparities reflect, however, is not that
general election spending allows incumbents to
trample their challengers. Rather, the anticipa-
tion of the incumbent’s fundraising advantage
discourages potentially strong challengers
from running.15 Not wanting to devote a year
or more of their lives to fundraising, only then
to be outspent, politically experienced individ-
uals decide to remain in their current positions,
to wait for an open seat, or to pursue more
promising avenues for advancement. Incum-
bents, as a result, face weaker challengers, who,
because they are weak, raise less money.
A closely related consequence is that capable
candidates who might articulate different views
or give voice to constituents and groups outside
the incumbent’s electoral coalition are “cen-
sored” by the campaign finance system. Having
never entered the race, they are not heard or ob-
served, making the electoral forum a less mean-
ingful site for the competition of ideas as well as
candidates. As the Supreme Court has recently
suggested, preventing the discouragement of
candidacies is a value worth preserving. In Ran-
dall v. Sorrell, the Court nullified Vermont’s ex-
ceptionally low contribution limits in part be-
cause they magnified incumbency advantages
and undermined electoral accountability:
[C]ontribution limits that are too low can
also harm the electoral process by pre-
venting challengers from mounting effec-
tive campaigns against incumbent office-
holders, thereby reducing democratic ac-
countability. Were we to ignore that fact,
a statute that seeks to regulate campaign
contributions could itself prove an obsta-
cle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to
promote. (Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.Ct. 2479,
2492 (2006)).
The problem thus becomes how to enhance
competition and dialogue without regulating
the spending or speech of candidates or im-
posing tight restrictions on the contributions of
voters or parties. The challenge, in other words,
is to more nearly equalize spending without re-
stricting it.
In what follows, I sketch a new approach to
campaign finance with the above problems in
mind. The next section describes the key ele-
ments of the proposal, inviting the reader to
identify political and substantive problems, re-
flect on proposed and alternative provisions, or
simply grunt disapprovingly along the way.
The purpose here is not to articulate and de-
fend a full-blown proposal for reform. Rather,
it is to initiate a broader discussion about cam-
paign finance reform post-BCRA and in par-
ticular about one approach, an approach that
builds upon normative standards of equal rep-




The main idea of the present proposal is to
legally authorize and privately endow a new
campaign finance institution, the Expenditure
HALL148
14 Calculated from numbers reported at: http://www.
opensecrets.org/bigpicture/incumbs.asp?Cycle2004.
15 The literature on this point is substantial. See, e.g; Gold-
enberg, Trauggott, and Baumgartner (1986); Snyder
(1992); Epstein and Zemsky (1995); Stone, Maisel, and
Maestas (2004); Levitt andWolfram (1997); Box-Steffens-
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Goodliffe (2001).
Equalizing Commission (EEC). Using income
from its endowment, the EEC would distribute
matching campaign funds, automatically and
without conditions, to eligible congressional
candidates according to one simple principle:
Minimize inequalities in “public communica-
tion” expenditures16 for the two (perhaps
more) viable candidates running in the general
election for the same congressional office.17
Thus, during a given election cycle, the auto-
matic grants would variously subsidize Re-
publicans and Democrats and possibly third
party candidates, conservatives and liberals,
competitors for open seats, and when fully ma-
ture, challengers and incumbents. In this sec-
tion, I lay out the proposal’s key features, then
turn in the following section to an analysis of
its virtues and vices.
Endowment
EEC contributions to candidates will be fi-
nanced from the income on a private endow-
ment. Such an endowment will need to be very
large, even if the plan is applied initially to only
one chamber. The enabling legislation for the
EEC would thus allow it to receive contri-
butions unlimited in size and number from 
any source—individuals, corporations, labor
unions, public interest groups, foundations,
and other non-profits—though for political rea-
sons they would not be tax-deductible. The size
of the endowment potentially needed and the
problems of raising it are taken up below. But
for now, the feature worth emphasizing is that
once the necessary endowment is raised, the fix
for campaign finance will become permanent
in a way that most public financing proposals
are not. No annual or biannual budget fights
over government campaign spending will
arise; no raids on, say, a trust fund budget
would be possible. Indeed, no taxpayer dollars
will be at stake; thus no anti-government or
anti-politician sentiments can give traction to
the Commission’s opponents.
Governance
The EEC would be a non-profit entity, whose
legal organizational form will remain unde-
fined here. However, the general idea is that it
be something like a quasi-governmental orga-
nization on the order of Fannie Mae or Freddy
Mac or a new type of foundation, which new
statutory language would need to authorize.
Alternatively, it might be defined under the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) as a
new type of campaign finance entity, not sub-
ject to the restrictions of campaign committees,
parties, or PACs.
Like a foundation, the EEC would be gov-
erned by a board of trustees. Each EEC trustee
would have a fiduciary responsibility to see
that EEC funds are spent to advance its sole
mission of diminishing inequalities in adver-
tising expenditures for candidates running for
the same congressional office. The authorizing
legislation would need to specify how the ini-
tial trustees would be selected, but any of sev-
eral mechanisms could work. For instance, the
current FEC might compile an expansive list of
individual nominees including (i) former FEC
professional staff, (ii) retired judges with expe-
rience in FECA cases, and/or (iii) non-partisan
legal and foundation experts specializing in ar-
eas relevant to campaign finance and electoral
politics. Those on the list could then select, say,
eleven from among themselves through ap-
proval voting or some other means. To moni-
tor for possible partisan bias that might none-
theless arise, likewise, each of the two national
parties might also select one trustee. Trustees
would serve a fixed term, with the initial terms
staggered. New trustees would be selected in
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more expansive McCain-Feingold definition of “Public
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301(b)(22), 301(b)(23), and 301(b)(24) of FECA of 1971 (2
U.S.C. § 431)). That definition reads: “The term ‘public
communication’ means a communication by means of any
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper,
magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing or
telephone bank to the general public, or any other form
of general public political advertising.”
17 Limiting EEC subsidies to general election candidates
creates a number of potential problems, which for pres-
ent purposes are swept under the rug. For instance, a ma-
jority legislator in a one-party state or district would be
more indebted to unions or industries for providing the
funds she needed to win her primary. I focus solely on
the general election here (i) so as to convey more clearly
the working features of the proposal and (ii) as a conces-
sion to EEC logistics and costs. Ultimately, both primary
and general elections would need to be subsidized
through an EEC mechanism.
the same way from subsequent lists compiled
by the Board. The goal here, in any case, is to
develop a process that selects individuals with
a reputation for integrity, non-partisanship,
and a commitment to the organization’s mis-
sion.
Eligibility criteria
A more important means of insuring the
EEC’s reputation for legitimacy is to lay out its
grant-making process and criteria in its found-
ing charter, so as to make its decisions as me-
chanical as possible. For the duration of any
given campaign, the eligibility standards for
candidates to receive EEC funds and the EEC’s
allocation formula for awarding them would be
fixed, thereby limiting opportunities for parti-
san mischief. The specific criteria and thresholds
for awarding campaign finance grants will need
to be worked out in greater detail than is possi-
ble here. The following particulars are offered to
suggest some questions that will need to be
faced and possible means for addressing them.
The principal activity of the EEC would be
to allocate funds based on a formula, driven by
the campaign communication expenditures of
the financially advantaged candidate in the
race. The idea is to give matching grants to fi-
nancially disadvantaged candidates to help
them diminish the gap in communication
spending between them and their opponents.
However, contributions to the needier candi-
date would not be guaranteed. As with the
presidential campaign financing system, mini-
mal eligibility criteria would insure that the
EEC does not waste funds on long-shot candi-
dates, that is, on races that are unlikely to gen-
erate a remotely competitive race even if their
campaigns receive EEC subsidies. Thus the
EEC would require that the applying candidate
be minimally “viable.” Viability criteria would
include some combination of the following: (i)
The candidate’s national party organization
has already contributed the maximum amount
to her campaign allowable under law. (ii) The
candidate has already raised a certain thresh-
old of campaign funds on her own, in the form
of a specific fraction (say, one-fourth) of the
other candidate’s receipts (thus tailoring the
threshold to the variable campaign costs dis-
trict to district). (iii) An independent poll shows
that the candidate exhibits voter support above
some specific threshold (say, 30% in a two-way
race) by the beginning of the general election
campaign. In setting precise viability criteria,
however, the trick will be to set them high
enough that they exclude lost causes in search
of a soapbox but not set them so high that the
EEC fails to serve its pro-competitive purpose.
Specifically, the threshold needs to be low
enough that high-quality candidates consider-
ing a run can reasonably anticipate that they
will qualify for EEC funding.
Allocation formula
The EEC would allocate funds on a match-
ing basis so as to help disadvantaged candi-
dates achieve effective equality with the campaign
communication expenditures by or for their ad-
vantaged opponents. The funds would come in
the form of a matching grant, capped at one-
third of the gap in the two candidates’ post-
nomination communication expenditures.18
About this formula, four points:
(1) The sufficiency of a one-third cap in
achieving “effective equality” follows from the
substantial body of research showing that cam-
paign spending in the general election helps
under-funded challengers far more than re-
source-rich incumbents.19 The latter simply hit
a point of diminishing marginal returns more
quickly than do their opponents. Until recently,
in fact, a long line of studies found that higher
campaign spending by incumbents actually de-
creased incumbent vote share. A recent paper
by Stratman (2004) has adjusted for significant
measurement error in candidate spending,
however, finding that the incumbent’s mar-
ginal product of advertising is, in fact, positive.
Even so, it is smaller for incumbents than chal-
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EEC-supported candidate’s campaign exceed her oppo-
nent’s expenditures. At that point, the financially advan-
taged candidate becomes the disadvantaged one and
could qualify for EEC grants.
19 See Jacobson (1978) for the seminal statement of this
finding. The subsequent literature is nicely summarized
in Stratmann (2004). As an illustration, the five chal-
lengers who defeated incumbents in 2004 spent on aver-
age about $400,000 less than the incumbents.
lengers. A ten percent increase in spending for
incumbents, Stratmann finds, accounted for up
to a 1% increase in vote share, whereas for chal-
lengers it accounts for up to a 1.5% increase.
Using Stratmann’s calculation of candidates’
marginal products, equality of campaign ad-
vertising product can thus be achieved for the
challenger at two-thirds of incumbent commu-
nication expenditures. Assuming that high
quality candidates, with their newly motivated
contributors, could raise funds at the margin
enough to finance one third of the gap, the EEC
match would cover the other third.20 For open
seat races, likewise, 67% should be adequate in
that such races are inherently more competitive
on financial and non-financial grounds.
(2) Communication expenditures will be
matched rather than total campaign expendi-
tures, because a substantial share of a candi-
date’s total expenditures goes to overhead—
staff salaries, travel, fundraising events, and
the like—whereas EEC grants would come
with virtually no overhead. Ansolabehere and
Gerber (1994) have calculated that candidates
spend on average two to three dollars out of
five on “voter contact,” the definition of which
is only a little broader than the BCRA defini-
tion of public communication expenditures. If
acquiring timely, detailed reports on candi-
dates’ communication expenditures proved
unworkable, the Commission fallback formula
could simply be 40% of total campaign expen-
ditures (or even receipts) as an approximation
of public communication spending.
(3) The matching formula could provide vari-
ation according to size and source of the contri-
bution, ideas rehearsed in earlier reforms at the
state and federal level. For instance, in order to
provide incentives for financially disadvantaged
candidates to seek out a broader, if costlier-to-
reach, donor base, the EEC could set a higher
matching rate for money raised through small
individual contributions, say, under $500 (e.g.,
$2 for $1), and a lower matching rate (e.g., $1 for
$1) for larger contributions from individuals,
perhaps a still lower match (e.g., $1 for $2) from
PACs.21 Likewise, the matching formula could
be made more generous for within-district/state
contributions from individuals.
(4) All communications by or on behalf of a
candidate would count toward the candidates’
communication expenditures, including per-
sonal funds or electioneering communications
by advocacy organizations, as those expendi-
tures are defined by the BCRA.22 Hereafter, I
include them whenever referring to a candi-
date’s communications or advertising expendi-
tures. Insofar as the interest group expendi-
tures can be counted, the EEC matching feature
should diminish interest group incentives to
circumvent the spirit of Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC) regulations on electioneering.
Grandfathering incumbents
In the beginning the EEC would only operate
in races for open seats; then it would remain op-
erable in all subsequent elections for that seat,
even when an incumbent is running.23 In effect,
current but not subsequent incumbents would
be grandfathered under this proposal.24
Several reasons justify this provision. First, it
is unreasonable, perhaps even a bit unfair, to
expect career politicians, who have invested a
great deal in developing a campaign infra-
structure under long-standing rules of the
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20 At designated intervals, the EEC would calculate the
gap in relevant spending by the two candidates. Subse-
quent spending by the underfunded candidate of up to
one-third of the calculated gap would be designated for
matching purposes, thus avoiding the situation where the
raising and spending of matching funds make the gap cal-
culation a moving target.
21 On the benefits of graduated matching, see Campaign
Finance Institute Task Force (2003).
22 Proposed amendments to BCRA would require the FEC
to regulate Section 527 organizations according to the
same reporting guidelines and spending limits as politi-
cal action committees. Such an amendment would make
it possible to incorporate 527 spending into the matching
calculations proposed here, thereby creating disincentives
for 527s to continue to raise and spend large sums. In the
short run, at least, such a change would also increase sig-
nificantly the cost of the EEC. Briffault (2005) argues that
subjecting 527s to regulation may run afoul of constitu-
tional concerns. For the purposes here, however, timely
reporting by 527s to the FEC is all that would be required.
23 Races would be eligible for EEC funds post-reappor-
tionment if and only if there is no grandfathered incum-
bent running, including cases where redistricted incum-
bents are running against each other.
24 It should be noted that grandfather provisions have
their precedents in previous congressional campaign-re-
lated reforms. In the late 1980s, Congress passed new re-
strictions that prohibited members of Congress from con-
verting leftover campaign cash to personal use. The law
employed a grandfather clause that allowed such con-
versions for incumbents who left office by 1992.
game, to selflessly deflate that investment’s
value. The grandfathering need not be indefi-
nite, however. Limiting it to, say, five cam-
paigns would be enough for current House 
incumbents, two campaigns for Senate incum-
bents, to adapt their organizations to a new set
of rules.
Second and more importantly, a grandfa-
thering provision should diminish incumbents’
opposition to legislation enabling the creation
of an EEC. The perennial problem in campaign
finance reform politics is that the very politi-
cians who have succeeded under the existing
system are the ones who must change it. As I
have noted, incumbents tend to enjoy a sub-
stantial fundraising advantage over potential
challengers. It is more than a little unlikely that
sitting members of Congress would accept a
system that would generate stronger chal-
lengers to them in the next election. The rela-
tively small size of the maximum EEC subsidy
should diminish that opposition, but grandfa-
thering will do so more effectively.
A third reason goes to the proposal’s finan-
cial viability. Below I take up the potential costs
of the proposal and the size of the endowment
that would be required. Suffice it to say here
that with the EEC at first in the business of only
subsidizing races for open seats, the short run
costs would be considerably lower and the time
available for raising a substantial endowment
considerably longer.
Immediate reporting
Most of the important advertising occurs in
the last weeks of the campaign. Hence, for our
EEC subsidies to have their equalizing effect,
candidates, parties, and independent organiza-
tions would need to report advertising buys to
the FEC on-line at the time of purchase (con-
tract) for all advertising being run in the last
month of the election. This would permit
timely allocations to “under-funded” candi-
dates by the Commission during the late stages
of a campaign. In addition, the BCRA closed
certain disclosure loopholes that had thwarted
transparency and accountability over the last
several elections. Fortunately, we are at a stage
in the information age when instantaneous
transmission of information is not only possi-
ble but cheap. Were the timely reporting of
campaign communication expenditures never-
theless to prove too cumbersome, then as I have
suggested above, 40% of receipts could serve
as a reasonable approximation.
VIRTUES
As I have pointed out along the way, the ben-
efits of introducing an EEC into the campaign
finance system would be several and impor-
tant. This section reviews them and considers
some additional ones.
Changed incentives, voluntary reform
The most important feature of this proposal
is that it operates through a mechanism quite
different from current campaign finance law.
Almost all campaign finance plans, at both the
state and federal level, have attempted to limit
the size of contributions to various political ac-
tors and, directly or indirectly, control the level
of campaign spending. Thus is campaign fi-
nance law regulatory and proscriptive. As such,
actors in the system are naturally inclined to
find creative but legal ways of circumventing
the constraints foisted upon them. Sooner or
later, they do. The EEC proposal benefits from
some of the campaign finance regulations al-
ready in place, but it proceeds in a different
way. It aims to restructure the incentives of ac-
tors in the system so that their purposive, vol-
untary behavior will promote rather than cir-
cumvent the equalizing objectives of reform.
More competitive elections, more 
informative speech
The straightforward implication of the
change in challenger incentives brought about
by the EEC subsidies is that more congressional
races will be competitive. The subsidizing na-
ture of the plan would increase the incentives
of high quality candidates to run for congres-
sional office, thereby enhancing competitive-
ness. Without having to raise nearly as much
money, they can anticipate that they will not
be substantially outspent. Likewise, raising
money will be easier. The matching nature of
the subsidies will increase the fundraising abil-
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ities of financial underdogs by increasing the
incentives of potential contributors to contrib-
ute (or to contribute more).
The equalizing nature of the grants, in turn,
will diminish the incentives of incumbents or
other financially advantaged candidates to so-
licit ever greater donations. Potential contribu-
tors to incumbents, likewise, will have less in-
centive to contribute. Why make a donation if
it is going to be largely offset by EEC money
going to the opponent? The deterrence to can-
didacies caused by incumbent fundraising
would thus be curtailed. A related implication
is that incumbents will be less likely to run un-
opposed, at least in areas where viable compe-
tition is feasible. Candidates with different
ideas or appealing to previously unrepresented
constituencies will have a greater opportunity
to enter the political debate.
More parity in spending
Ceteris paribus, parity in candidates’ cam-
paign spending should go up. As emphasized
above, automatic EEC subsidies to the finan-
cially disadvantaged candidate should reduce
the incentive for advantaged candidates to
raise extremely large sums of money. Rather,
they should seek a level of spending up to the
point where the marginal return in election
probability per dollar spent, given the other can-
didate’s matched fundraising, approaches zero.
That is, more spending is better only if the can-
didate thinks he needs it more than his oppo-
nent. So too with the challenger. Should she
take the spending lead (above some minimum
threshold), the same disincentive would then
apply to her, as her fundraising would trigger
matching grants to the formerly advantaged
opponent. The arms race should thus become
self-regulating.
Less post-election indebtedness to private groups
Automatic EEC subsidies should induce spe-
cial interests to contribute less to well-posi-
tioned members. As a consequence, the subsi-
dies should diminish the dependence of
legislators on contributions from organizations
who foresee that their interests in legislation or
oversight will come before Congress. While
money at the challenger’s margin will be
matched for free by the EEC, the cost of rais-
ing money for the incumbent will go up after
the easy donors have been tapped. Should the
challenger (or under-funded incumbent) win,
in turn, a significant portion of her campaign
expenditures will be financed not by private
groups but by the EEC, which will not seek to
cash in any policy debts after the election.
No First Amendment problems
Given that the EEC will only enable speech
rather than restrict it, First Amendment objec-
tions to this campaign finance reform disap-
pear. Those who have wrestled in the campaign
finance reform arena over the last decades will
recognize this as a major political as well as
substantive virtue. Even though the Supreme
Court has resolved the constitutional doubts
about BCRA restrictions, future reforms that
avoid further insults to the First Amendment
will doubtless be politically stronger.25
Money without ideological or partisan bias
The EEC will be non-partisan by its charter.
It will give to Democrats, Republicans, and
even third party candidates according to eligi-
bility criteria and allocation formulae consis-
tent with the charter and consistent across can-
didates and races. While it is difficult to know,
the introduction of neutral funds into the sys-
tem might also diminish the polarization gen-
erated by candidates’ financial dependence on
ideological and single-issue groups.
Public-like financing without public financing
Many reformers have long thought public fi-
nancing to be the optimal—but politically least
viable—form of campaign finance reform. The
political difficulties result in large part from
EQUALIZING EXPENDITURES IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 153
25 Campaign reforms built upon McConnell v. Federal Elec-
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Richard Briffault (2002) argues that “McConnell is as pre-
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specific holdings and the Court’s basic approach to cam-
paign finance restriction could be dramatically trans-
formed if and when the membership of the Court
changes.” Of course, with the replacement of Rehnquist
and O’Connor by Roberts and Alito, that membership has
changed.
public reluctance to pay the cost out of tax
funds and in part from ideological objections
to government participation in election cam-
paigns. The EEC proposal provides the benefit
of disinterested campaign financing without
the taxpayer cost of public financing and with-
out triggering the ideological objections.
Relief from the money chase?
As a general matter, it is not obvious that too
much is being spent on congressional cam-
paigns (Ansolabahere, de Figueiredo, and Sny-
der 2003). Within broad limits, campaign ad-
vertising is actually quite informative, charges
about advertising’s bias and emotional manip-
ulation notwithstanding (Brader 2005). But it is
a problem that incumbent legislators and their
party leaders spend too much time raising
funds. The more private fundraising that leg-
islators do, the more time they are giving in-
formal access to lobbyists who represent in-
dustries and groups able to make substantial
contributions. Magleby and Nelson (1990) re-
fer to this as “the money chase.” One member
reported that it makes him “feel unclean.” And
it is one of the most common complaints that
members of Congress express about their jobs.
For some, it has become so burdensome that
they might sympathize with a system that re-
duces it, even if it will only benefit their suc-
cessors. Lobbyists likewise complain about
members of Congress regularly “shaking them
down” for contributions. Beyond that, Magleby
and Nelson observe, the money chase takes up
a great deal of a legislator’s time—time better
spent meeting with rank and file voters, over-
seeing agencies, or drafting legislation.
Under the present proposal, however, it is
not obvious that total spending would go
down. One of the most important objectives of
the equalizing formula is to encourage higher
quality candidates to run. Campaigns should
thus become more competitive, and competi-
tive races should exhibit higher spending by
both candidates, ceteris paribus. The net effect
of this proposal on aggregate spending should
thus vary across races, but, even so, the in-
cumbent’s incentive to create exorbitant war
chests should be undercut. His money chase
should thus slow down.
Democratizing money?
The prospect of matching funds increases the
incentive of candidates to pursue smaller con-
tributions. A higher match for small contribu-
tions would directly promote that, but even a
standard 1:1 match would do so in that it dou-
bles for every donor the marginal benefit with-
out doubling the marginal cost. To the extent
that current campaign messages are developed
with an eye to donors as distinct from voters,
more inclusive fundraising strategies may also
shape the campaign dialogue as well.
VICES
Of course, one can immediately think of sub-
stantial counterarguments to the reform pro-
posal outlined here. I will take up three classes
of problems, leaving the most important—
problems of political viability—to the follow-
ing section.
Strategic incumbents
One of the principal purposes of this plan is
to increase competitiveness in congressional
elections, mainly by encouraging quality chal-
lengers to run. If they do, they raise more
money and they receive more grants. At the
same time, the proposal would make it diffi-
cult for a challenger to significantly outspend
an incumbent.26 In fact, it is possible that in-
cumbents would adapt to the new system by
pursuing the exact opposite of a preemptive
strategy. Incumbents might raise and spend
very little and thereby ensure mutual silence
because their competitors, not being outspent,
would not qualify for EEC subsidies. Without
the ability to spend a substantial sum, in turn,
challengers could not overcome the natural ad-
vantages of incumbency, such as name recog-
nition, media attention, casework, and the like.
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but it is not necessary to outspend incumbents. In only
two of the last ten election cycles have successful chal-
lengers averaged higher spending than the defeated in-
cumbents. See http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/
cost.asp.
Challengers would be left to their own
fundraising devices, and what funds they
raised, ironically, could be matched by grants
to the underfinanced incumbent. The probable
result: a non-competitive race and a less-in-
formed electorate, just the opposite of the pro-
posal’s intentions.
Three reasons make this strategy less likely
in practice than reasonable on paper. First, it
would probably appear counter-intuitive and
more than a little risky for an incumbent to as-
sume that he would win more votes by adver-
tising less. Indeed, a sit-out-the-campaign strat-
egy might itself generate criticism from
supporters and the media. Second, the quality
challenger’s incentive to run in the first place
and hence her ability to raise funds would still
be enhanced, as both the potential challenger
and the potential donors would know that the
incumbent employing this strategy will not ef-
fectively outspend the challenger. The presence
of a quality challenger advertising against him,
in turn, would likely stimulate the defensive in-
stincts of the incumbent, leading him to raise
the money for a serious campaign.
Third, even if an incumbent strategy of qui-
escence were to undercut competitiveness, it
would also leave the reelected incumbent with-
out indebtedness to private donors. Nor would
the incumbent have spent weeks of work-time
every year holding fundraisers and feeling un-
clean. Given that incumbents overwhelmingly
win in the present system, the proposal would
thus do no worse than the status quo on com-
petitiveness but would be considerably better
at disengaging big money from congressional
politics.
Interest group circumvention
Money can enter a campaign through vari-
ous sources other than the campaign commit-
tees of individual candidates and their parties.
The flow of such money was regulated by the
provisions regarding “electioneering commu-
nications” in the BCRA, but these restrictions
do not ban such communications, they only
regulate their source and timing. Other orga-
nizations, such as interest group PACs, can
spend unlimited amounts on advertising to
promote a candidate of their choosing, so long
as their efforts are not coordinated with the
candidate’s campaign. Coordinated or not,
such money could generate a sense of indebt-
edness and thus be damaging to the integrity
of post-election policymaking. Under the pres-
ent proposal, such money spent demonstrably
on behalf of a candidate would be counted as
candidate expenditures and subject to an EEC
match.
More problematic for the present proposal,
as for the BCRA itself, is the unregulated
money introduced through Section 527 organi-
zations. 527s are tax-exempt entities whose
purpose is to influence federal elections but
who are unregulated in the size and source of
the contributions they receive. They entered
campaign politics in force in the 2004 presi-
dential elections, but their efforts carried over
to the 2006 congressional elections as well. The
problem here is that so long as their advertise-
ments avoid direct endorsement or opposition
to a specific candidate, they are not subject to
hard money regulations. That they do not en-
gage in express advocacy, in turn, makes their
spending difficult to classify as being on behalf
of a particular candidate. For EEC purposes, it
would be unworkably time-consuming and
perhaps unacceptably discretionary to attempt
to make this classification. Moreover, many in-
terest groups with 527s also have PACs and
501(c) organizations that coordinate their elec-
toral strategy, such that changing the incentives
of one may be offset by changes in the strate-
gies of the other (Weissman and Ryan 2006).
Campaign finance reform advocates have ar-
gued before the FEC and Congress that 527 or-
ganizations should be treated as political action
committees subject to regulations governing
hard money. Such changes would be necessary
if EEC subsidies are to deter these shadow com-
mittees from frustrating the goal of equalizing
spending.
Lurking partisanship?
The EEC will need to project an image of fair-
ness to politicians and the public and especially
the organizations and individuals who might
fund its endowment. The EEC system will thus
be non-partisan in its membership (save for
two party representatives), governance, eligi-
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bility criteria, and allocation formulae. Com-
mission members will have no role in fundrais-
ing for the endowment, and they will make dis-
cretionary decisions about cases by means of a
“blind review” whenever possible. Nonethe-
less, the recent history of the FEC leads one to
worry whether the commission proposed here
can achieve—and project—a high degree of
non-partisanship. This is no small matter, and
it is difficult to predict. As much as any other
feature of the system, this will require greater
attention if the proposal is to go anywhere.
For purposes of the proposal’s political via-
bility, it may be even more important that key
partisans in Congress believe that aside from
the partisan fairness with which the EEC sys-
tem is implemented, it will tend to be non-par-
tisan in its effects. This will concern even grand-
fathered incumbents, who care about the new
institution’s implications not only for their own
electability but for whether their party holds
the majority. The current evidence suggests
that the time may be right for an EEC-style re-
form on the House side. The number of in-
cumbents is about evenly split between the par-
ties. So far under the BCRA, neither party
seems to have a clear fundraising advantage,
at least insofar as hard money goes. The ad-
vantage of Republicans in House races grew in
2006, but the advantage of Senate Democrats
went up even faster. Ultimately the advantage
may go to the Republicans, mainly because of
the doubling of the contribution limits for in-
dividuals. But the electoral effect will be hard
to infer, in part because the House Republican
fundraising advantage in 2006 produced a
Democratic majority. Looking to the long run,
it probably will be difficult for either party to
adopt firm beliefs that the BCRA system favors
them more than the proposed one.
A non-adaptive institution?
The very fact that the EEC may prove insu-
lated from political bias, however, may mean
that it is not easily adapted to the inevitable
changes in campaign finance practices that
emerge over time. Presumably the governing
board, because of board members’ greater un-
derstanding of electoral and campaign finance
practice, would be better able than most rep-
resentative bodies to adapt, subject to its expen-
diture equalizing mandate. Should the EEC’s
equalizing role be outstripped by new and larger
funding sources, its continuation would at worst
do no harm—an advantage one cannot always
ascribe to well-intended reforms.
VIABILITY
To this point I have begged the question of
whether an expenditure equalizing commis-
sion could be created in the first place. What is
its political viability? Here is the main catch.
As with any other reform proposal, there
would need to be enabling legislation. Specifi-
cally, the EEC would require a special exemp-
tion under FECA to receive large donations
from foundations and other large benefactors.
It would likewise need an exemption to con-
tribute potentially large sums of money to par-
ticular congressional candidates. Significant
changes in campaign finance law, as we have
seen over the last six years, are difficult to
make, and the passage of the BCRA may have
satisfied demand and taken the issue of reform
off of the legislative agenda for some time. This
is hardly the only problem with the plan’s po-
litical viability, however.
Incumbents relinquishing advantage!?
The ever-present obstacle to campaign fi-
nance reform is that incumbent politicians, suc-
cessful under the current system, have inher-
ent disincentives to change it. Other things
equal, change raises their uncertainty about re-
maining in office. Enacting a statute authoriz-
ing an EEC whose purpose is less than incum-
bent-friendly will be difficult, to say the least.
The grandfathering provision is intended to
mitigate that problem. As seats come open in
one cycle and the new incumbents seek reelec-
tion in the next, the scope of the EEC’s reach
will gradually expand. Present incumbents oth-
erwise threatened by a new campaign finance
institution would have little to fear individu-
ally for several elections, and over time, an in-
creasing number of representatives will be
elected with the aid of EEC funds. After five
elections, all candidates would be covered.
HALL156
Two other features should make the pro-
posal politically more attractive. First, it erases
the (perceived) threat to incumbents posed by
“millionaire” candidates, i.e., those individuals
who can use their personal wealth without re-
striction to run high-priced campaigns. The
BCRA’s “millionaire amendment” partly ad-
dressed this advantage by allowing higher lim-
its for contributions to candidates running
against self-funded opponents. The present
proposal mitigates the millionaire’s advantage
further, in that personal funds will be subject
to EEC matches like other funds and flow to in-
cumbents like other financially disadvantaged
candidates. In such a case, whichever candidate
wins would enjoy diminished indebtedness to
private donors after the election.
The EEC’s fundraising mechanism should
also prove politically more palatable than pub-
lic financing proposals. Simply put, it will not
depend on public funding, thus avoiding the
principal stumbling block of otherwise attrac-
tive clean money reforms. Nor once authorized
will the plan depend on ongoing political sup-
port for funding, cycle after cycle. The rub, of
course, is building the endowment to support
an expensive system of subsidies.
A billion here, a billion there
That brings us to perhaps the most impor-
tant obstacle to the plan: funding. Any cam-
paign financing reform that hopes to separate
money from politics will require an ambitious
mechanism for fundraising that is independent
of campaigns. Long the ideal of most reform-
ers, public financing of congressional elections
has long faltered because of precisely this ob-
stacle. Citizens not being enthusiastic about tax
dollars going to pay for campaigns (among
other reasons), incumbent politicians have not
been willing to appropriate the money.
The pragmatic reformer’s question thus be-
comes: How might we devise a more equitable
campaign finance system while avoiding the
daunting political and economic costs of pub-
lic financing? The proposal here is to finance
the EEC matching funds program with the in-
come on a privately funded endowment. Such
an endowment would need to be substantial,
to say the least, but once established, would
provide a permanent, self-sustaining financing
mechanism. The first question thus becomes:
How large an endowment would be needed for
the plan to work? What follows is a back-of-
the-paper-sack estimate, the assumptions for
which are admittedly speculative, intended
mainly to promote further discussion. For pres-
ent purposes, I assume that, in the beginning,
the plan will only apply to House general elec-
tions, then be expanded depending on its ef-
fectiveness.
The plan will take effect gradually as more
districts become open in at least one election,
but for purposes of illustration, I shall assume
that when fully mature the EEC incentives in-
crease by half the number of competitive seats.
Given that competitiveness depends on a range
of factors other than campaign financing, this
would doubtless count as a resounding suc-
cess. In 2004 there were 71 seats where the win-
ning margin was less than 20%. About five of
these races saw rough funding equality and
would not have been eligible for subsidies.
Thus, 66 times 1.5 equals 99 races—for conve-
nience, rounded up to 100—in the steady state
where a general election candidate proves eli-
gible for EEC grants.
Second, I assume that the EEC incentives en-
able all qualifying, under-funded candidates to
raise matchable funds at the margin up to the
maximum. At the same time, I shall not assume
that the matches have a depressing effect on the
better-funded candidate’s fundraising ability.
Taken together, these two assumptions thus err
toward a substantial overestimate of the total
cost.
To estimate that cost, I shall work from the
more readily available statistics on candidate
total expenditures rather than public commu-
nication expenditures. As I note above, An-
solabahere and Gerber (1994) have calculated
that candidates spend on average two to three
dollars out of every five on “voter contact,” the
definition of which is only a little broader than
the BCRA definition of communication expen-
ditures. I’ll thus assume that 40% of all candi-
date expenditures go to campaign communi-
cations. Without any subsidy, the average gap
in expenditures in EEC-eligible races approxi-
mates the typical gap between an incumbent
and a quality challenger, which in 2004 dollars
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was about $750,000 or about $300,000 in spend-
able communication dollars. Assume further
that the financially advantaged candidates also
average an additional $100,000 advantage in
non-party independent advertising, which in
the present formula gets counted as if it were
candidate advertising. Taking into account the
67% incumbent/challenger return to advertis-
ing ratio discussed above, about $270,000
($400,000 x 67%) is needed to effectively equal-
ize the two candidates’ campaign advertising.
Assuming that the higher quality candidate
drawn into the race can, with the help of the
matching incentives, net half of that sum at the
margin, an average 1:1 match would generate
the other $135,000 in the form of a costless EEC
grant.
In order to achieve effective parity for every
eligible race qualifying for the maximum
match, the EEC would thus need 100 races x
$135,000 or $13.5 million, an amount that its en-
dowment would have to generate over two
years. Earning a real rate of return of 3.5%,
compounded annually, the endowment princi-
pal would thus need about $190 million to fi-
nance a fully implemented system for House
elections. But let’s assume that incumbents re-
spond irrationally by raising more, not less,
money in response to the stronger challengers,
and let’s assume that measurable independent
electioneering is double what I’ve assumed.
Then the cost of the system might be twice my
estimate, $380 million.
Could such an endowment be raised for an
institution that promises substantial benefits to
American democracy? Perhaps, if someone of,
say, John McCain’s stature took up the cause,
soliciting EEC contributions from wealthy in-
dividuals. A George Soros, a Ted Turner, or a
Ross Perot could cover it with a single check.
The new system could also solicit large grants
from the private foundations and good gov-
ernment groups that have already spent mil-
lions toward improving democratic institu-
tions in the U.S., among them Common Cause,
the Pew Charitable Trust, Congress Watch, the
Center for Public Integrity, the Campaign Fi-
nance Institute, Democracy 21, and the League
of Women Voters. Perhaps reform-minded in-
dividuals of lesser means, who have quit giv-
ing to campaigns because of the relative size of
their (immediately consumed) gift, might also
contribute to a fund whose benefits last well
into the future. With reform-minded individu-
als and foundations urging them to do so, over
time this might come to a substantial sum.
RETHINKING CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORMS
Over the years, students and advocates of
congressional campaign finance reform have
offered various proposals to repair the prob-
lems of the private money system, most com-
monly in some form of “clean money,” such as
free air time or public financing of congres-
sional campaigns.27 Before quitting the present
analysis, it is worth briefly comparing their
merits to the present proposal.
Public financing has the virtue of not re-
stricting campaign spending unless the candi-
date voluntarily accepts restrictions as a con-
dition of receiving public funds. And it has the
potential to diminish the reach of private
power into electoral and congressional politics.
So too does Ackerman and Ayres’ (2002) inno-
vative proposal in Voting with Dollars, a plan in
which the government would provide each
voter with fifty “patriot dollars” to contribute
to candidates or parties as she sees fit. Addi-
tional contributions by well-to-do individuals
or organizations would still be permitted, but
their impact on campaigns and hence on post-
election policymaking would be inhibited by
enforced anonymity, and they would be other-
wise “diluted by a flood of patriot dollars”
(Ackerman and Ayres 2002, 172).
Despite these virtues, both conventional
public financing and voting with dollars suffer
from the irony that a cynical public exhibits lit-
tle support for clean money proposals. The
leading scholar of congressional elections, Gary
Jacobson, puts it flatly: “financing congres-
sional campaigns with tax dollars has no ef-
fective constituency” (2006, 202). Distaste for
the idea is apparent in the small fraction (about
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money campaign finance reform for over three decades.
See http://www.commoncause.org. See also Magleby
and Nelson (1990).
1 in 9) of taxpayers who use their tax check-off
option to earmark (at no cost to themselves)
three dollars for public financing of presiden-
tial campaigns. The cost to taxpayers of fi-
nancing House elections alone would cost sev-
eral hundred million dollars in each electoral
cycle, depending on the funding formula,28 and
voting with dollars would cost much more.
That would be real money going to elect un-
seemly politicians who would then only catch
“Potomac fever” or practice “honest graft” af-
ter getting elected.
Even if adopted, public and legislative sup-
port for such substantial spending would need
to be sustained with each new Congress in the
face of perennial temptations to rescind the pro-
gram and free up funds for politically more at-
tractive appropriations. If a public financing
regime did hurt incumbents, the rationalizations
for putting the money to other, perhaps coun-
terproductive purposes would doubtlessly mul-
tiply. Malbin and Gais come to just this conclu-
sion in their study of state-level campaign
finance laws:
The problem is that maintaining legisla-
tive support over the long haul requires a
consensus in support of a program’s basic
purposes, and maintaining such a con-
sensus requires legislators to forego the
clear temptation, when they adjust a pro-
gram, to use their majorities for partisan
or divisive ends. This temptation is hard
to resist. (Malbin and Gais 1998, 73–74.)
The present proposal, in contrast, would re-
quire only initial authorization of an EEC in-
stitution. Thereafter, no appropriations need be
squeezed into budget subfunctions; no coali-
tions need be built; no killer amendments need
be fended off. Financial support will need to be
solicited, to be sure, but it’s possible that this
could be accomplished through the one-time
commitments of a few wealthy individuals or
foundations, were they to be persuaded of its
merits.
A second limitation of clean money propos-
als, if constitutionally devised, is that they do
relatively little to affect competitiveness in con-
gressional elections.29 With most matching
grant provisions, public financing provides at
least as much to candidates who already enjoy
a substantial fundraising advantage as to their
underfunded opponents. And if public fund-
ing does not protect that advantage, better fi-
nanced candidates need not participate. They
can opt out if, say, the spending caps attached
to public funds begin to erase their advantage.
In the eleven states with public funding for gu-
bernatorial races, Malbin and Gais (1998) found
that candidates for governor chose not to par-
ticipate in about a third of the cases. In two
states that had public financing of state leg-
islative races, they found that approximately a
fifth of the candidates did not participate. More
generally, their analysis of campaign finance
laws in all 50 states revealed that while a vari-
ety of public financing regimes had been tried,
“there is no evidence to support the claim that
programs combining public funding with
spending limits have leveled the playing field,
countered the effects of incumbency, and made
elections more competitive” (1998, 137).
Ackerman and Ayres’ proposal for anony-
mous contributions diminishes the expected
legislative value to contributors of donating
large sums to incumbents. Legislators will sim-
ply not know who their contributors are, and
thus contributors cannot credibly call in the
debts. If a system of effective anonymity could
be devised, a good deal of the interest group
money extorted by well-placed incumbents
would thus dry up. But it is doubtful that the
challenger would somehow gain the advantage
in raising private funds, as Ackerman and
Ayres suggest (2002, 40), or significantly offset
incumbents’ huge advantages. Incumbents
would still enjoy greater advantages in name
recognition and media attention that would
help them secure patriot dollars early and of-
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would then allocate the funds to races that had a reason-
able chance of success. See also the proposal for free me-
dia vouchers by the Campaign Finance Institute (2005).
The CFI’s own model of the proposal’s effects suggested
that its effects on competitiveness would be modest, per-
haps detrimental in Senate races in large states.
ten, which could then be used to attract still
more patriot dollars. If so, patriot dollars could
turn out to be incumbent reelection coupons. In
any case, the non-competitiveness of congres-
sional elections is not a problem that voting
with dollars is well-designed to address. The
present proposal, in contrast, targets the prob-
lem of non-competitive elections directly, with-
out immediately threatening the incumbents
who would need to authorize it nor requiring
them to provide the means to finance it.
CONCLUSION
This article has explored the idea of an Ex-
penditure Equalizing Commission for congres-
sional elections. If adopted and implemented,
it should promote significant, beneficial conse-
quences, first for House and later for Senate
elections. Of course, the confidence one might
have in that promise can only be speculative at
this point, given the numerous assumptions
and uncertainties neglected or set aside here.
Hence, this article is perhaps best read as an in-
strument for vetting the idea of extra-govern-
mental, self-regulating mechanisms for equal-
izing campaign expenditures.
Like the BCRA, the EEC system does not pre-
tend to solve all of the problems associated
with the current system. The financing mecha-
nism proposed here is something of a middle
ground between the status quo, which leaves
candidates too much at the mercy of large,
well-heeled donors, and a full-blown public fi-
nancing system, which would require pubic
money and cost hundreds of millions every
election cycle. Other reforms, currently being
debated, would enhance the effectiveness of
the EEC system. One is to bring 527 organiza-
tions into the same regulatory regime as PACs
and other hard money entities. A second is the
McCain-Feingold-Durbin bill recently before
Congress which would require radio and tele-
vision broadcasters to provide free air time to
candidates for political debate prior to general
elections (Campaign Finance Institute 2005).
However exploratory at this point, new
modes of campaign finance warrant discussion,
for the stakes are high. The current system ex-
acerbates the low competitiveness of congres-
sional elections and it has significant, detrimen-
tal consequences for post-election congressional
policymaking. Elected or reelected to Congress,
the member brings his campaign baggage with
him to his legislative office. Implicit debts or
connections to donors occupy some significant
space in his satchel. And in all likelihood, those
donors will be needed two years hence.
This indebtedness is insidious in several
ways. As noted above, it is not at all clear that
campaign contributions buy votes. But if they
only buy greater access to a member or to the
legislative process, they have compromised the
equality of political representation. Money gives
extra voice to those who would make demands
or pursue their interests. Even if it buys only a
little access, even a little access can go a long
way, depending on the group’s lobbying strat-
egy. Access often gives a group or individual or
industry the opportunity to subsidize the leg-
islative effort of busy members on issues where
member and group have coincident interests
(Hall and Deardorff 2006). Thus are members’
priorities changed even if their positions stay the
same. The ideas and interests of groups who lack
the capacity to contribute get less attention and
representation as a result, and the collective de-
liberations of Congress are less fully informed.
The “appearance of corruption”—a standard
made constitutionally meaningful by the
Court—has not been diminished much by the
BCRA. Candidates still need to depend heavily,
if not primarily, on the largesse of organized
outsiders who give with an eye to furthering
their private interests on the inside. As long as
this dependence remains, the public will rightly
remain skeptical of the claim that interest groups
are giving something for nothing.
REFERENCES
Ackerman, Bruce and Ian Ayres. 2002. Voting with Dol-
lars, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, John de Figueiredo, and James
Snyder, Jr. 2003. ‘Why Is There So Little Money in U.S.
Politics?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (Winter)
105–130.
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Alan Gerber. 1994. “The Mis-
measure of Campaign Spending: Evidence from the
1990 U.S. House Elections.” Journal of Politics 56 (No-
vember): 1106–18.
HALL160
Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. 1992. The Lobbyists: How Influence
Peddlers Get Their Way in Washington. New York: Times
Books.
Boatright, Robert G., Micahel J. Malbin, Mark J. Rozell,
and Clyde Wilcox. 2006. “Interest Groups and Advo-
cacy Organizations after BCRA.” In Michael J. Malbin,
ed., The Election After Reform. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. 1996. “A Dynamic Analysis
of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy.” Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 2 (May): 342–371.
Brader, Ted. 2005. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Briffault, Richard. 2002. “McConnell v. FEC and the Trans-
formation of Campaign Finance Law.” Election Law
Journal 3(2): 147–176.
Briffault, Richard. 2005. “The 527 Problem . . . and the
Buckley Problem.” George Washington Law Review, 73:
949.
Campaign Finance Institute. 2002. http://www.cfinst.
org/studies/vital.
Campaign Finance Institute. 2005. “Radio-TV Vouchers
for Congressional Races Likely to Increase Competi-
tiveness and Promote Public Debate.” http://www.
cfinst.org. July 14, 2005.
Campaign Finance Institute Task Force. 2003. “Participa-
tion, Competition, Engagement: Reviving And Improv-
ing Public Funding For Presidential Nomination Poli-
tics.” http://www.cfinst.org/presidential/report.
Coleman, John J. and Paul F. Manna. 2000. “Congressional
Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy.”
Journal of Politics 62 (August): 757–789.
Cooper, Joseph, ed. 1999. Congress and the Decline in Pub-
lic Trust. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Corrado, Anthony. 2003. “A History of Federal Campaign
Finance Law.” In Thomas Mann, ed., Campaign Finance
Sourcebook, 2nd Ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti-
tution Press.
Epstein, David and Peter Zemsky. 1995. “Money Talks:
Preempting Quality Challengers in Congressional Elec-
tions.” American Political Science Review 89 (May):
295–308.
Evans, Diana. 1996. “Before the Roll Call: Interest Group
Lobbying and Public Policy Outcomes in House Com-
mittees.” Political Research Quarterly 49 (June): 287–304.
Franz, Michael M., Joel Rivlen, and Kenneth Goldstein.
2006. “Much More of the Same: Television Advertising
Pre-and Post-BCRA.” In Michael J. Malbin, ed., The Elec-
tion After Reform. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Gais, Thomas. 1996. Improper Influence: Campaign Finance
Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Goldenberg, Edie N., Michael W. Trauggott, and Frank R.
Baumgartner. 1986. “Preemptive and Reactive Spend-
ing in U.S. House Races.” Political Behavior 8(1):3–20.
Goodliffe, Jay. 2002. “The Effect of War Chests on Chal-
lenger Entry in U.S. House Elections.” American Journal
of Political Science 45 (October): 830–44.
Grier, Kevin B. and Michael C. Munger. 1993. “Compar-
ing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and
Senate Incumbents, 1980–86.” Journal of Politics 3 (Au-
gust): 615–643.
Hall, Richard L. and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. “Lobbying
as Legislative Subsidy.” American Political Science Re-
view 100 (February): 69–84.
Hall, Richard L. and Frank Wayman. 1990. “Buying Time:
Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Con-
gressional Committees.” American Political Science Re-
view 84 (November): 797–920.
Hojnacki, Marie and David Kimball. 1998. “Organized In-
terests and the Decisions of Whom to Lobby in Con-
gress.” American Political Science Review 92 (December):
775–790.
Jackson, Brooks. 1990. Honest Graft. Big Money and the
American Political Process. New York: Knopf.
Jacobson, Gary. 1978. “The Effects of Campaign Spend-
ing on Congressional Elections.” American Political Sci-
ence Review 72 (September): 769–83. 
Jacobson, Gary. 2003. The Politics of Congressional Elections,
Sixth Edition. New York: Longman.
Jacobson, Gary C. 2006. “The First Congressional Elec-
tions After BCRA.” In Michael J. Malbin, ed., The Elec-
tion After Reform. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Krasno, Jonathan K., Donald P. Green, and Jonathan A.
Cowden. 1994. “The Dynamics of Campaign Fundrais-
ing in House Elections.” Journal of Politics 56 (May):
459–74.
Langbein, Laura I. 1986. “Money and Access: Some Em-
pirical Evidence.” Journal of Politics 48 (November):
1052–62.
Langbein, Laura and Mark Lotwis. 1986. “The Political Ef-
ficacy of Lobbying and Money: Gun Control in the U.S.
House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 15 (3): 413–40.
Levitt, Steven D. and Catherine D. Wolfram. 1997. “De-
composing the Sources of Incumbency Advantage in
the U.S. House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22: 45–60.
Lowenstein, Daniel H. 1989. “On Campaign Finance Re-
form: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted.” Hoefstra
Law Review 18 (Fall): 1989.
Magleby, David B. and Candace J. Nelson. 1990. The
Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Makinson, Larry. 2003. Speaking Freely: Washington Insid-
ers Talk About Money in Politics, 2nd Edition. Washing-
ton: Center for Responsive Politics.
Malbin, Michael J., ed. 2006. The Election After Reform. Lan-
ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Malbin, Michael J. and Thomas L. Gais. 1998. The Day Af-
ter Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the
American States. Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute
Press.
Mann, Thomas E. 2005. “The FEC: Administering and
Enforcing Campaign Finance Law.” In Anthony Cor-
rado et al., eds. The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook,
2nd Ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press.
Mann, Thomas E. and Norman J. Ornstein. 2002. “Myths
and Realities about the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
EQUALIZING EXPENDITURES IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 161
Act of 2002.” On the Docket. Washington: Democracy
21. May 7.
McCain, John. 2004. “Reclaiming our Democracy: The
Way Forward.” Election Law Journal 3 (2): 115–121.
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93
(2003).
Ortiz, Daniel R. 2005. “The First Amendment and the Lim-
its of Campaign Finance Reform.” In Anthony Cor-
rrado et al., eds., The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook,
2nd Ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
Snyder, James Jr. 1992. “Long-Term Investing in Politi-
cians, or Give Early, Give Often.” Journal of Law and
Economics 35 (April): 15–43.
Stern, Phillip. 1998. The Best Congress Money Can Buy. Pan-
theon.
Stone, Walter J., L. Sandy Maisel, and Cherie D. Maestas.
2004. “Quality Counts: Extending the Strategic Politi-
cian Model of Incumbent Deterrence.” American Jour-
nal of Political Science 48: 479–495.
Stratmann, Thomas. 2004. “How Prices Matter in Politics:
The Returns to Campaign Advertising.” Unpub-
lished ms. http://economics.uchicago.edu/download/
campad_4-19-04.pdf.
Stratmann, Thomas. 2005. “Money in Politics: A (Partial)
Review of the Literature.” Public Choice 124: 135–156.
Tripathi, Mickey, Stephen Ansolabehere, and James M.
Snyder. 2002. “Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying
Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobbying Dis-
closure Act.” Business and Politics 4: 131–155.
VandeHei, Jim and Jeffrey H. Birnbaum. 2004. “Kerry Is-
sues List Detailing Contacts With Lobbyists,” Wash-
ington Post, April 22, p. 1.
Weissman, Stephen R. and Ruth Hassan. 2006. “BCRA
and 527 Groups.” In Michael J. Malbin, ed., The Elec-
tion After Reform. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Weissman, Stephen R. and Kara D. Ryan. 2006. “Non
Profit Interest Groups’ Election Activities and Federal
Campaign Finance Policy: A Working Paper.” http://
www.cfinst.org.
West, Darrell M.and Burdett A. Loomis. 1999. The Sound
of Money. New York: WW Norton.
Wright, John R. 1990. “Contributions, Lobbying, and
Committee Voting in the House of Representatives.”
American Political Science Review 84 (June): 417–438.
Wright, John R. 1996. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobby-
ing, Contributions, and Influence, Needham Heights,
MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Address reprint requests to:
Richard L. Hall
Ford School of Public Policy
4130 Weill Hall
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
E-mail: rlhall@umich.edu
HALL162
